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ESSAYS
APPROACH-AVOIDANCE IN LAW SCHOOL HIRING:
IS THE LAW A WASP?
RICHARD DELGADO*
I. INTRODUCTION
In two landmark articles,1 Alan Freeman extends the critique of
rights to American race reform law.' For Freeman, antidiscrimination
law does little to restrain racist behavior, 3 unerringly takes the "perpe-
trator perspective,"' 4 and reinforces the racial status quo by periodically
proclaiming great victories,5 which are offered as proof that our system
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of
Law. J.D. 1974, University of California-Berkeley. I gratefully acknowledge the assis-
tance of Harriet Cummings, Sandra Talbott, Lisa Delgado and Leslie Proll in the prep-
aration of this article. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University
of California-Berkeley School of Law.
1. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978)
[hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing]; Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Re-
view, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
2. The critique of rights has been put forward most persuasively by members of
the Critical Legal Studies School (CLS). See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62
TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984); see also Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Le-
gal Studies Have What Minorities Want? 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 303-07
(1987) (summarizing CLS critique of rights).
3. See Freeman, Legitimizing, supra note 1, at 1050; see also Delgado, supra
note 2 at 303 (claiming that rights legitimize unfair power arrangements in society);
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1766-74 (1976) (judicial reasoning is indeterminate).
4. See Freeman, Legitimizing, supra note 1, at 1052-57, 1118; see also infra
notes 57-58 and accompanying text (explaining the term "perpetrator perspective").
5. These victories include Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(segregation of children in public schools, on the basis of race, deprives them of equal
opportunities, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
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is fair and just.6 Their ringing principles are later predictably cut back
by narrow judicial interpretation, foot-dragging or delay.' Civil rights
law thus serves as a type of safety valve, assuring that society has ex-
actly the right amount of racism.'
These assertions, which have been echoed by other critical schol-
ars, have until now been offered in something of an empirical vacuum.
Now, a number of surveys and reports are beginning to offer support
for their rather bleak conclusions. 9 In a recent article10 and forthcom-
ing book,11 Professor Roy Brooks summarizes some of this evidence.
Focusing on a mainstay of liberal jurisprudence, the principle of formal
equal opportunity, Brooks traces in devastating detail the way that
principle subordinates and injures Blacks. Formal equal opportunity
does not sacrifice a few, for example the Black lower class, in return for
gains for the rest. Rather, that principle harms lower, middle and up-
per class Blacks alike.
12
Brooks' demonstration should come as no great surprise. Law is
part of society. In a racially divided society, the legal system will not
promote racial justice; indeed, it will often promote the direct opposite
unless the majority sees that it is in its interest to do so. In civil rights
law, formal egalitarianism subordinates Blacks in two ways.13 Blacks
6. See Freeman, Legitimizing, supra note 1, at 1052-57, 1118; see also Delgado,
Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved? 97 YALE
L.J. 923 (1988).
7. See Freeman, Legitimizing, supra note 1, at 1051, 1097, 1118.
8. Too much racism would be destabilizing; too little would forfeit important
psychic and material advantages for the dominant group. Delgado, supra note 2, at
303-04. See generally Delgado, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, FALLING BEHIND: A
REPORT ON How BLACKS HAVE FARED UNDER THE REAGAN POLICIES (1984) (Pov-
erty and unemployment have increased significantly among blacks, in the 1980's, as a
result of federal budget cuts and tax policies.); J. Smith & F. Welch, CLOSING THE
GAP: FORTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR BLACKS xxiv-xxv, 81, 101-11 (1986)
(Rand Corporation report finding an increase in the number of Black families headed
by a female and an increase in the number of Black males unemployed or no longer
looking for jobs). Statistics and analysis show that the "racial differential" or "racial
gap" stands at approximately two to one, roughly the same as it was a generation ago.
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUD-
IES SERIES P-23, No. 80, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in
the United States: An Historical View 1790-1978, at 20 (1979).
10. Brooks, Racial Subordination Through Formal Equal Opportunity, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 881 (1989).
11. An expanded version of the article will be published by the University of
California Press under the title Rethinking the American Race Problem (1990). Pro-
fessor Brooks is not a member of the CLS school.
12. See Brooks, supra note 10, at 898-928 (formal Equal Opportunity subordi-
nates and injures Black middle class); id. at 928-60 (formal Equal Opportunity subor-
dinates and injuries Black working class); id. at 960 (formal Equal Opportunity subor-
dinates and injures Black underclass).
13. These are called active and passive subordination. See Brooks, supra note 10,
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entered this century at a great disadvantage vis-a-vis whites because of
the legacy of slavery. Formal equality perpetuates that disadvantage,
ensuring that whites' head start is not easily overcome.14 Formal equal
opportunity also subordinates Blacks by enabling society to avoid guilt
over the nonwhite underclass.1" Why, in a formally just system, should
a Black or Hispanic be poor, out of work, reviled, or working at an
unrewarding, dead-end job? Since systemic racism has been eliminated,
the only possible explanations are lack of ability or effort, or simple bad
luck. The principle also reinforces white superiority. Under it, non-
whites are judged with scrupulous fairness by criteria coined by,
normed on, and applied by whites.16 Not surprisingly, the latter gener-
ally come out ahead; yet because all have had an equal chance, each
person's lot must be roughly what he or she deserves."
This Article is concerned with this latter, largely unconscious,
form of subordination through mindset and preference. I choose an
area with which most readers will be familiar-diversity hiring on law
school faculties. Beginning in the early 1970s, law schools began taking
measures to increase the small number of minorities of color teaching
law. 8 Yet, after a few years of growth, this increase stagnated. The
overall numbers remain nearly constant; most law schools have zero or
one minority faculty member. 9 While the number remains the same,
the turnover rate is high. Over forty-three percent of professors of color
left teaching in a recent six-year period.2 0 Most law faculties purport to
be troubled by figures like these.21 They would like to hire more women
and minorities, yet something always seems to get in the way: The pool
is so small; minority candidates are rarely available when you want
at 894-95 (the terminology is my own).
14. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (racial gap is not closing).
15. See Freeman, Legitimizing, supra note 1, at 1054-55. See generally Delgado,
supra note 6.
16. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 309-10 (law creates cultural myths to legiti-
mize current arrangements).
17. See id.; see also Freeman, Legitimizing, supra note 1, at 1054-55.
18. See, e.g., Report on Special Admissions at Boalt Hall, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC.
363 (1976); Romero, Delgado & Reynoso, The Legal Education of Chicano Students:
A Study in Mutual Accommodation and Cultural Conflict, 5 N.M.L. REV. 177 (1975).
19. See, e.g. Kaplan, Hard Times for Minority Profs, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 10, 1984,
at 1, col. 1; Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American
Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 538 (1988).
20. This rate is higher than that for whites. Open Letter to Our Colleagues of
the Minority Race, Aug. 1986 (letter signed by 21 minority professors and sent to
every Association of American Law Schools accredited law school, on file with author).
See generally Delgado, supra note 6.
21. See, e.g., Prager, President's Message: Minority Law Teachers, A.A.L.S.
NEWSL., Nov. 1968, 1 (decrying lack of diversity in law school faculties, urging col-
leagues to redouble efforts).
1990]
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them; they have so many opportunities elsewhere.2 2 Whether these dif-
ficulties are real or mythical, grounded in self-serving and unexamined
mindset, is the subject of this essay.
II. WHY MINORITIES AND WOMEN CANNOT BE HIRED AT THE
GOOD LAW SCHOOLS
First-the reasons you hear.
They don't write.
They write too much.
They can't teach.
They are too immersed in teaching.
They're diamonds in the rough; we may have to wait another gen-
eration or two.
They are too assimilated-they won't relate to our minority
students.
They lack the standard credentials-law review, federal clerkship,
etc.
They are too standardized, too assimilated, they won't relate to
our minority students.
They're uncongenial, have chips on their shoulders.
They have great interpersonal skills and charm, but lack the disci-
pline to sit down and write.
They are too narrow and are only interested in civil rights and
employment discrimination.
They spread themselves too thin-try to be all things to all people.
These reasons, which are put forward in greatest sincerity and
good faith, are of course riddled with contradiction.2" They represent a
series of dualisms, each assertion paired with another stating the direct
opposite. Where an area of discourse contains such inconsistencies, we
should look for a deeper contradiction which runs through the area and
is responsible for them.2
I believe I know what that deeper contradiction is: Liberal law
faculty members both want, and fear, minorities and women. They re-
alize they should have more of us, and would like to welcome us into
the fold. But at the same time they fear us, and want us to keep our
distance. We are unsettling-we are Other. We talk and act strangely,
laugh at unexpected times. We take the wrong things seriously and
22. See Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (discussing these and other myths and "stories"
the dominant group tells each other to justify lack of diversity).
23. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1685 (role of binary oppositions in legal doc-
trine; oppositions depend on and yet contradict each other, producing manipulability
and indeterminacy in reasoning).
24. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 205, 211-13 (1979).
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don't take the right things seriously enough. It would be wonderful if
there were more of us who did think and talk just like them. If so, they
would hire us on the spot. But, alas, there are not. So the search con-
tinues for the perfect minority, that mythic figure who will solve the
basic contradiction, who will be both Other and like us.
White male faculty members thus both want and fear minorities.
This conflict is no recent development. During slavery and the Bracero
era, society needed and wanted us for our labor.25 They commodified,
thingified us, and found us useful, just as women were useful for repro-
duction and household work.26 But over time they noticed something
curious about their subjugated groups. We were human, had feelings,
dreams, would laugh and show warmth and emotion. They would be-
gin, almost, to like us, then pull back. Attraction-repulsion, you see it
even today in the earnest conversation of the dominant group on the
Black problem, the Mexican problem, women, and minorities in the
law school.27
This conflictedness explains many of the shifts and lunges of law
faculties over hiring and tenuring minorities. Law faculties want us for
what we can offer as role models and counselors for minority students,
and public relations coups. 28 They also want us for ourselves. Their so-
cial instincts tell them white male ghettos are wrong.29 But at the same
time they fear us, our differentness, our strange ways, our kinship with
that other other group, the students. So, they act inconsistently, now
moving toward, now away from us.
Let me illustrate this unconscious dance by means of an example I
observed recently. Every year, I receive a number of phone calls and
letters from law schools asking about minority candidates for teaching
positions. (At least, I used to get a lot of calls before writing this Es-
say). This year I knew of an exceptional Hispanic woman who was
looking for a job. What kind of person of color do the good schools say
they are looking for and would hire instantly if they could find? 30 First,
25. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 1-53 (2d ed. 1980).
26. See id. (slaves treated as chattels; bought and sold); see also Delgado, supra
note 6 (summarizing commodification of nonwhites and women).
27. See Delgado, supra note 22, at 2418-21, 2431-35; see also infra notes 29-31
and accompanying text (recounting the failed effort to secure appointment for a His-
panic woman).
28. See Prager, supra note 21. These multiple duties often overburden professors
of color once they are hired. See, e.g., Delgado, Minority Professors' Lives: The Bell-
Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 352-53 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Prager, supra note 21.
30. Most candidates hired in recent years do not have these credentials. For ex-
ample, A.A.L.S. profiles for all new law teachers hired in 1986 showed fewer than 10
percent were awarded Order of the Coif, fewer than 30 percent were on the law review,
and fewer than 10 percent had one or more publication to their credit. Memorandum
to Deans of Member Schools, from Millard H. Rudd & Noel J. Augustyn (A.A.L.S.,
1990]
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the candidate would have to have gone to an excellent undergraduate
school and earned good grades in a broad but intellectually rigorous
course of instruction. This candidate had done so. The person also
would need to have attended a first-rate law school and excelled aca-
demically. This candidate had; indeed, she had graduated in the top ten
percent of her class. The candidate should have written articles in good
law reviews and be an able classroom teacher. The candidate would
have to be collegial, not one of those alienated, chip-on-the shoulder
minorities that might call you something unpleasant over lunch in the
faculty club, nor so assimilated that the minority students would de-
clare him or her a fraud. The candidate had been performing all these
juggling acts with skill and grace.
Moreover, she had personal reasons for wanting to teach at a
school (school X) which I knew to have a number of openings. So I
sent along her resume and a short but glowing letter. When I followed
up later with a phone call, the chair of X's appointments committee
said the candidate was in a small group they were considering for an
international law position. Too bad she didn't teach public international
law (just the private version), or the curricular fit would have been
perfect. But the school had several slots to fill and if she didn't fit one
she would be considered for another. Alarm bells ringing, I offered to
inquire whether she would be willing to teach public international law.
The chair said no, they would discuss teaching options with her later. A
month or so later, I heard the school had offered the public interna-
tional law position to a recent visitor. So I called to see how the His-
panic candidate was doing. The chair said she was still under consider-
ation, and asked whether she would be willing to teach Torts.
To make a long story short, the school did not offer the job to the
Hispanic woman. They decided to make their Torts position an entry-
level one, and the Hispanic, who had taught a few years, did not qual-
ify. The school had an opening in tax, but she did not teach that sub-
ject. Later in the season, the school had a visiting position to fill when a
faculty member unexpectedly took leave, but by then the young woman
had made other plans. The events reminded me of a shell game, played
out perfectly unwittingly by the candidate and appointments commit-
tee. Each time an opportunity came up, each time a shell was turned
over, the candidate happened not to be under it. Everyone who con-
cerns himself or herself with minority hiring can tell stories of this sort.
Bad luck, bad timing, poor curricular fit-things never quite work out.
III. THE WRITING-PUBLISHING REQUIREMENT
I shall now address a particular roadblock to the hiring of profes-
Sept. 5, 1986, on file with author). Yet, with minority hiring many law schools insist on
all these attributes of stardom.
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sors of color, namely the writing-publishing requirement. Could it be
that if the timing, credentials, and courses taught were right in the case
of a given candidate of color, something about Third World scholarship
puts off majority-race members of appointments committees at the
good schools? Might it be that across-the-board application of neutral-
seeming criteria of good scholarship has a "disparate impact" on mi-
nority candidates?31 Does something occur at a level of mindset or sec-
ond nature 32 that causes majority-race professors to look at the writing
of Blacks and Hispanics and say, "That's second rate," and to prefer
some other article written by an author who is white and male? This
would be deselection not through conscious bigotry, but prioritization
and preference for the familiar."3
Recent feminist writing has argued that the law is male, that its
structures, mindset, presuppositions, methodology, and mental pictures
are male.3 Doctrine and legal structures are normed on a male model,
and so it is not accidental that many women experience law school as
alien and intimidating, that there are few women judges, law profes-
sors, and partners, and that legal rules and doctrines are skewed
against women. 5 Society is patriarchal, law is patriarchal, and female
subordination simply follows. It is not that lawyers, judges and legisla-
tors are consciously anti-female (most of them, at any rate), it is just
that they are so steeped in anti-women values and approaches that fe-
male subordination follows ineluctably.36
So, if the feminists are right, as I think they are, the law is a male.
Is that male also a white Anglo Saxon Protestant, WASP? 37 If so, that
may well have something to do with the small number of professors of
31. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (job requirements dispropor-
tionately burdening Black applicants, standing alone, do not trigger the rule that racial
classifications are to be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny).
32. See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 566, 567-76 (1984) (discussing role of mindset and the
lack of citation to works by minority scholars); see also Delgado, supra note 21 (ideol-
ogy and mindset represent powerful forces shaping actions of judges, lawyers and
clients).
33. See id.
34. See McIntyre, The Maleness of Law and Its Impact on Women Students
(1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Dif-
ferent Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, I BERK. WOMEN'S L.J.
39, 44 (1985); Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 83, 92 (1980); Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW 299 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); see also Olsen, The Sex of the Law (unpublished
manuscript on file with author); Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordi-
nation and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 117 (D. Kairys, ed. 1982).
35. See, e.g., Polan, supra note 34; Taub & Schneider, supra note 34.
36. See supra note 35; McIntyre, supra note 34.
37. The acronym stands for "White Male Anglo-Saxon Protestant." See P.
SCHRAG, THE DECLINE OF THE WASP 14-15 (1971).
19901
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color teaching at the top schools. Social scientists have been fascinated
by, written volumes about, the WASP.38 Throughout our history
WASPs have been the dominant class in the United States. 39 Their
principal traits are said to be: cautious, upwardly mobile,40 objective
and unemotional; social Darwinists, committed to thrift and hard work,
elevation of abstract principle over personal relations and personal loy-
alty, incrementalists.41
As with the feminist argument, it seems likely that if our culture's
dominant values are those of the WASP, the same will be true of law:
It will be incremental rather than expansive, abstract rather than con-
textualized, cautious rather than utopian, etc. Those will also be the
traits of "good" legal scholarship: narrowly focused, cautious, incre-
mental, abstract, footnoted, and so on. And, of course, they are.42 The
law is not only a WASP in matters of intellectual style; it is a WASP
numerically - WASPs outnumber minorities by a large factor and
dominate most large firms and federal agencies."3 In our early days,
WASPs signed the Declaration of Independence44 and framed the Con-
stitution, providing delicately in ten places for the institution of slavery
without mentioning the word.45 No minority of color has ever served as
president or, except on three occasions, in the United States Senate. 6
38. See, e.g., id.; B. SOLOMON, ANCESTORS AND IMMIGRANTS (1956); E. BALT-
ZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT (1964); R. WILKINSON, AMERICAN THOUGHT
(1984); M. HALSEY, No LAUGHING MATTER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A WASP
(1977); C. ANDERSON, WHITE PROTESTANT AMERICANS (1970); RACE AND ETHNICITY
IN MODERN AMERICA (R. Meister ed. 1974).
39. See, e.g., P. SCHRAG, supra note 37; E. BALTZELL, supra note 38, at 22, 66.
But see R. CHRISTOPHER, CRASHING THE GATES, THE DE-WASPING OF AMERICA'S
POWER ELITE (1989) (White ethnics, including Irish, Italians, Catholics and Jews
making inroads in WASP strongholds).
40. See, e.g., C. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 95-172; P. SCHRAG, supra note 37,
at 22-28. See generally E. BALTZELL, supra note 38; H. JAMES, THE AMERICAN (1877).
41. See id.; E. BALTZELL, supra note 40, at 13, 15-17; R. WILKINSON, supra note
38, at 38-39, 44-45, 102.
42. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 2, at 307 (incremental, narrow); see also A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (14th ed. 1986) (most issues of most law reviews illus-
trate the use of the "Blue Book").
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 388 (1989) (3.4 percent of lawyers and judges are
Black); SYLVESTER, Women Gaining, Blacks Fall Back. 6 Nat'l L.J., May 21, 1984, at
1, col. 3 (2.6 percent of U.S. lawyers are Black, while Blacks made up 11.9 percent of
U.S. population).
44. See, e.g., Marshall Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1988).
45. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 933 n.2; see also D. BELL, supra note 25, at
22-23.
46. The only Black Senators have been Edward Brooke (R-Mass., 1967-79), Hi-
ram Revels (R-Miss., 1870-71), and Blanche Bruce (R-Miss., 1875-81). See CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 648 (3d ed. 1982).
[Vol. 34:631
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Early on, Blacks were prevented from voting,47 and even today vote at
lower rates than Whites in most elections.48 There is little mention of
these matters in the law school curriculum;49 the law addresses the con-
cerns of WASPs and WASP clients. Even shop talk is sanitized; human
factors are reduced to "fact situations."
In the debate over affirmative action, one sometimes hears it
asked: Should a less qualified woman or person of color win the job
over a more qualified white male? At first glance, this way of framing
the issue might seem odd. White males have benefited from affirmative
action, an unjustified preference in jobs, promotions and other social
benefits, for over two hundred years. Opening the doors to women and
minorities should mean that the quality of workers and students will go
up, not down, when the unearned preference men received from the
old-boy system is eliminated. But those who frame the issue this way
persist even when this is pointed out; it is easy to see why. White men,
who have been in charge a long time, have been able to disseminate
any ideology, promulgate any standards of merit they wish. In time,
they were required to give up some of the cruder means by which con-
trol was maintained, such as explicit racial subordination, spousal
abuse, and so on. Yet, all the job descriptions remained in place and
the game continued to be played by the same rules. Those rules, by a
neat trick, define what we mean by a fair contest. And so, as one femi-
nist puts it, law will reinforce existing distributions of power, will ex-
clude us most when it is most lawful, most legalistic, meritocratic, and
most "fair."5
So, the norms for good legal scholarship are: incremental, cau-
tious, objective, rational, etc.51 When we set Third World writing side
by side with those norms, what do we find? First, we find that a good
deal of Third World writing is co-authored. 2 We are not so individual-
istic, alienated, and lonely as our white brothers and sisters. We like
working collaboratively on occasion, cooperating rather than compet-
ing, sharing rather than guarding secrets. This troubles appointments
committees. When two or more persons co-author an article, how can
you tell who did what? Further, much of our scholarship is utopian, not
incremental, passionate, not dispassionate, and so on. WASPs are, for
47. See D. BELL, supra note 25, at 134-45 (describing the use of violence,
threats, and chicanery to prevent Blacks from exercising their franchise).
48. See id. at 155 & n.l.
49. Slavery is generally given only cursory coverage, and few law students learn
in law school about the Bracero program, Indian treaty violations, or immigration
dragnets.
50. See McIntyre, supra note 34, at 9 (attributing this to Catherine
MacKinnon).
51. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
52. For example, at a recent meeting of Latino law professors, nearly one-half of
those present had co-authored an article within the past few years.
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the most part, satisfied with the world; at most it needs fine tuning."
We want to change it.54 Our scholarship strikes majority-race evalu-
ators as impetuous, result-oriented. "It's a good article, but too emo-
tional. It sounds more like a brief."
Even the form of our articles can cause consternation. When Der-
rick Bell was selected to write the Foreword to Harvard Law Review's
Supreme Court issue, he wrote The Civil Rights Chronicles,55 a series
of parables, dreams, sketches, and morality tales. Brilliant, but I could
almost see heads shaking around the land asking what kind of article is
this? We cite peculiar sources. 56 When white people write about equal-
ity or civil rights, they generally cite each other.57 When we write
about civil rights, we cite such exotic sources as DuBois, Higginbot-
ham, and Derrick Bell. How can one evaluate scholarship resting on
such unfamiliar foundations?
Majority-race writers unerringly take the perpetrator perspec-
tive,58 looking for a specific guilty party, such as a KKK member or
vicious-willed school board member, to blame for racism, and coin
elaborate rules of intent and causation to limit liability for everyone
else.59 We take the victim perspective,"0 and want to push past techni-
cal hurdles and begin discussing relief. So, when appointments commit-
tees look at our writing and make the decision whether to accept one of
us, they want to determine whether they like the way we think,
whether we and they are on the same wave length. And, in many ways
we are not. It is not that our writing is inferior to theirs, or the other
way around. It is simply different, and they have defined the difference
in their favor.
Yet, I must now say that this seems to me only part of the story.
For many of us are bilingual, so to speak. Some of our articles and
books are in the co-authored, exuberant, passionate, etc., mode (like
this one). Yet, we can speak in the other mode, as well. So, for exam-
ple, Derrick Bell has written The Civil Rights Chronicles, heavy in
myth and metaphor, but he has also written Serving Two Masters,61 a
53. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 301; see also supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
54. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 301.
55. Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Foreword: The Civil Rights Chron-
icles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985); see also D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987)
(expanded version of the Foreword).
56. See Delgado, supra note 32, at 576.
57. See id. at 561-66.
58. See id. at 571.
59. See id.; see also Freedman, Legitimizing, supra note 1, at 1054-55 (only
"intentional" discrimination violates antidiscrimination principles).
60. See Delgado, supra note 32, at 569; Freeman, Legitimizing, supra note 1, at
1054-55.
61. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
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classic of the cases-and-policies genre. I myself wrote The Imperial
Scholar,62 plus some other deviationist things here and there.6" But, I
have also written some standard pieces on cause-in-fact 6 4 that are prob-
ably cited in your Torts case book.6 5
So, it is not just that some of our intellectual products make ap-
pointments committee members uneasy, although they do. Many of us
also write things that are right up their alley. The real, deeper reason is
that they both want us and fear us; they are not comfortable with us.
And the reason has nothing to do with qualifications in the usual sense,
although it does have something to do with the one qualification that
really matters-a white face.
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE? AN "OUTRAGEOUS" LIST
What can be done? I am pessimistic about helping members of
appointments committees past their existential dilemma, their funda-
mental contradiction. Perhaps, however, it is possible to get them to
reformulate the problem slightly, to stop thinking about it in approach-
avoidance terms. One can, for example, frame the absence-of-minori-
ties problem as an educational or psychological one: Particular students
would learn law more readily if the faculty included more people of
color and women. One can also link it with public relations concerns.
At two major law schools, students harbored a long list of complaints
ranging from too few Third World professors to inadequate public-in-
terest placement services. So, they solicited alumni donations and held
them in trust until things changed.66
One can try persuading the faculty that it will be better if it em-
braces diversity, that the school's ranking will not suffer if it has one or
two Derrick Bells on hand to shake things up occasionally. One can try
bargaining and lawyerly precision: If we can find a Black or Chicano
who has published an article in any of the top 20 law reviews and has
above average teaching evaluations at an accredited law school and is
willing to come here, will you offer a year's visit? 7 Suppose the com-
mittee does carry out a vigorous search, which fails. One can try to get
it to leave the position unfilled or to use a temporary visitor to fill the
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
62. Delgado, supra note 32.
63. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 2; Delgado, supra note 6.
64. See Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Inde-
terminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982).
65. E.g., M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 234 (4th
ed. 1987).
66. They soon did.
67. See Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee, & Hubert, Fairness and Formality: Mini-
mizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIs. L. REV.
1359 (formal rules and structures tend to exclude prejudice).
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slot. That way, when the visitor leaves, the position is still open, maybe
to be filled by the perfect minority. If nothing else works, one can get
one-third of the faculty to agree to vote against every white male can-
didate, no matter how simpatico or brilliantly credentialed, until the
school hires X minorities and Y women.
Many of these strategies may seem harsh and extreme. As Kristin
Bumiller writes, though, that is the way it is with racial wrongs. The
victim feels guilty. You think you are the unsettling one, the person
who is over-reacting, disturbing the status quo.18 And so it is with ide-
ology; its strength is its seeming-naturalness. We must struggle to
throw off the mental chains that bind us or we will never be free.
68. See Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of
Legal Protection, 12 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'y 421, 425-26, 431, 437
(1987).
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